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1963] RECENT DECISIONS 335 
PATENTS-PATENT GRANT BY PRIVATE LAW-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
GRANT AFTER EXPIRATION oF Tll\rn LIMIT-An army officer invented a radar 
system before World ·war II but was prevented from patenting it by his 
superior officers for security reasons. In 1945 his application for a patent 
was rejected because it was not filed within the time limit embodied in sec-
tion 102(b) of the Patent Code.1 Congress, in 1950, enacted Private Law 
10082 to waive the statutory time limit for the officer's patent application. 
The act provided that a patent should issue from the 1945 application if 
the invention .met all the other statutory requirements of the Patent Code. 
The act provided also that the patent right should not be enforced against 
those using or manufacturing the device before the patent was issued except 
to the extent of payment by the users of reasonable royalties. The patent 
issued in 1957 and plaintiff, as assignee of the patent, brought this action 
for infringement against the defendant, who had manufactured the patented 
device before passage of Private Law 1008 and was continuing that manu-
facture at the time of the suit. Defendant moved for a declaration of in-
validity of the private law and for a permanent injunction restraining 
enforcement. Before a three-judge distrfot court, held, motion denied. 
Under prior legislative and judicial practice, the concept of exclusiveness 
1 35 u.s.c. § 102(b) (1958). 
!! 64 Stat. A243 (1950). 
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reflected in the patent clause of the Constitution has been shown to be 
flexible enough to include protection for intervening rights. However, the 
rights of the public to an invention in the public domain have never been 
considered as vested rights and may be rescinded discriminatorily if there 
exists a state of facts that reasonably justifies it. Radio Position Finding 
Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 205 F. Supp. 850 (D. Md. 1962), afj'd per curiam, 
371 U.S. 577 (1963). 
As upheld by the court in the principal case, Private Law 1008 had two 
effects. First, the statutory requirement that a patent application must be 
made within one year was waived for this particular patentee. In order for 
the patent to issue, however, the invention had to fulfill all other statutory 
requirements of the patent laws. Second, although the patent rights were 
to be retroactive to the patentee's 1945 application, the rights could not 
be enforced against those using or manufacturing the device prior to the 
passage of Private Law 1008, except to the extent of requiring a reasonable 
royalty payment for the right of manufacture during that period and 
until the patent expires. This, in effect, provided for a compulsory licensing 
of the patent rights to those who were using and manufacturing the device 
prior to the passage of the private law. The result of the act was to correct 
the inequities to the patentee caused by the military situation at the time 
of invention, while also protecting the rights of prior users. 
Congressional action by private law to relieve an inventor is not un-
precedented when a patent application has been frustrated by circumstances 
not within the inventor's control. In both Graham's Adm'r v. Johnson (the 
Fire Extinguisher Case),3 and Page v. Holmes Burglar Alarm Tel. Co.4 
private acts were upheld that provided for the issuance of patents long after 
the statutory time limit for application had run. Both cases provided sub-
stantial precedent for the specific holdings in the principal case. Both held 
that the public has no vested interest in an invention that is within the 
public domain. The private acts upheld in the Holmes and Fire Extin-
guisher cases contained provisions similar to the one in the principal case 
protecting the rights of intervening users, thereby providing for nonexclu-
sive patent grants. 
The patent clause of the Constitution5 authorizes Congress to grant to 
inventors for a limited time the "exclusive rights" to their discoveries. The 
principal case is a major instance of judicial determination of the scope of 
the "exclusive rights" grant. Congress has provided on occasion, both by 
general statute6 and by private act,7 for the issuance of patents which, due 
3 21 Fed. 40 (C.C.D. Md. 1884). 
4 1 Fed. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1880). 
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
6 At present only the reissue provision in the patent statute provides for the protec• 
tion of intervening rights. 35 U.S.C. § 252 (1958). Previously the extension provision pro• 
tected intervening rights, but it has been deleted from the present code. For the last 
enactment of the extension statute, see 64 Stat. 316 (1950), giving extension rights to 
veterans of World War II. 
7 See 15 Stat. 356 (1868) for a private act similar to the one in the principal case. 
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to the reservation of the rights of prior users of the patented item, were not 
grants of exclusive rights to the patentee. In the reported cases involving 
these statutes, no indication of doubt exists as to congressional power to 
grant nonexclusive patents that provide for the protection of prior users' 
rights.8 The historical policy of the patent laws provides an explanation for 
the unquestioned acceptance of nonexclusive patent grants. On grounds of 
public policy, monopolies were not favored by the common law,9 but patent 
grants to inventors were a recognized exception on the premise that they 
promoted invention.10 This reasoning was literally adopted in the Constitu-
tion, which provides that "exclusive rights" may be granted "to promote the 
progress of science and the useful arts." It is natural that the drafters of the 
Constitution, fully cognizant of both the common-law aversion to monop-
olies and the frequent granting of patents to inventors, would state the 
patent policy explicitly in order to prevent any misunderstanding as to the 
use of the grant of exclusive rights. To accomplish its stated purpose of 
promoting invention, the patent clause should be construed as a plenary 
grant of power to Congress to secure to inventors exclusive rights, or any 
appropriate lesser degree of dominion. 
The defendant's second claim, that Private Law 1008 is invalid because 
it is a deprivation of vested rights and therefore unfair, is refuted by a 
consideration of the nature of the public's right to an invention in the 
public domain. At common law the inventor had no natural right to con-
trol of his invention, any exclusive right being purely statutory.11 The 
public was fully able to take advantage of the invention unless the inventor 
could protect the invention by secrecy. Such is still the case until the in-
ventor acts to invoke the benefits of the patent laws. The common-law 
courts, although generally opposing all monopolies, recognized that the 
policy underlying patent grants did vitiate the public's right to an inven-
tion even if it had been in the public domain.12 Early American patent 
laws had no time limit for securing a patent, such as the bar embodied in 
section 102(b) of the Patent Code, the inventor being able to apply for a 
patent at any time after the invention.13 Since its inception the statutory 
8 The judicial practice of enforcing Jaws in which the patent grant is nonexclusive 
has been common. However, the courts have never been called on to decide the issue. 
See Dable Grain Shovel Co. v. Flint, 137 U.S. 41 (1890); Agawam Co. v. Jordon, 74 U.S. 
(7 Wall.) 583 (1868); Bloomer v. McQuewen, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539 (1852); McCiurg v. 
Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202 (1843); Evans v. Jordan, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 199 (1815). 
The courts themselves have required compulsory licensing of patent rights in antitrust 
violations. E.g., United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947). 
9 See I ROBINSON, PATENTS 1-28 (1890). 
10 See AMDUR, PATENT FUNDAMENTALS 51 (1948); 1 ROBINSON, op. cit. supra note 9, at 
9, IO. 
11 See A11muR, op. cit. supra note 10, at 51; 1 ROBINSON, op. cit. supra note 9, at 37; I 
WALKER, PATENTS 1152 (1937). 
12 See I ROBINSON, op. cit. supra note 9, at 9. This policy was codified in the Statute of 
Monopolies, 21 Jae. I, c. 3 (1623), and in the Constitution of the United States. 
1s l Stat. 318 (1793). 
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time bar has varied from two years to the present one-year limitation. Dur-
ing the period between invention and issuance of a patent the public is 
free to use the invention, but loses this privilege after the patent is granted. 
It is evident, therefore; that the length of time an invention has been in the 
public domain has never served to vest the public's right to the invention; 
the right is always subject to termination by the legislative grant of patent. 
The time limitation contained in the statute is only a condition to the 
government's grant of exclusive rights to the patentee and may be removed 
or changed as Congress may see fit. Congress is not bound by its prior legis-
lative acts if a constitutional grant of authority may be implemented by 
other means.14 
Private Law 1008 did no more than enable a patent to be secured by 
waiving the statutory time bar. To be invalid as a denial of due process, 
as claimed by defendant, the effect of the act must be so discriminatory as 
to shock the sense of fair play.15 If there exist facts that reasonably justify 
the effect, the act cannot be unconstitutional as being discriminatory.16 The 
rationale for the patent grant is clearly stated, however, and if this purpose 
is plainly not fulfilled the grants are not justifiable and are therefore dis-
criminatory. One of the major traditional implementations of the patent 
policy in promoting science is that of disclosure of the invention to the 
public.17 However, in the present case this implementation is of no con-
sequence, since knowledge of the invention was already in the public 
domain and had been exploited by others. Because it is not universally 
applicable in all patent cases, disclosure would appear to be of only second-
ary importance as a justification and therefore not controlling in the prin-
cipal case in the determination of the discriminatory character of Private 
Law 1008. 
Hence the justification for the act must derive from the second means of 
implementing the general purpose of the patent laws: the incentive to the 
inventor that is provided by his opportunity, for economic gain, to exploit 
the invention without competition.18 Although the efficacy of the patent 
14 See Bloomer v. Stolley, 3 Fed. Cas. 730 (No. 729) (1850). The patent grant is often 
said to be a contract between the patentee and the public. See I ROBINSON, op. cit. supra 
note 9, at 23. The patent laws are an offer to grant a patent in return for the consideration 
of disclosure and the inventor's activity. Under this theory the time limitation is a con-
dition to the offer that may be waived by the offeree. The court in the principal case 
analogized the bar to a statute of limitations and, on the authority of Campbell v. Holt, 
ll5 U.S. 620 (1885), felt that the bar itself could vest no right and might be removed at 
the discretion of the legislature. 
15 Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954). 
16 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Kotch v. River Port Pilot Comm'r, 
330 U.S. 552 (1946). 
17 Transparent-Wrap Mach. Co. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947); Scott 
Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945); Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 Fed. Cas. 
648 (No. 1518) (C.C.D. Mass. 1839); see l ROBINSON, op. cit. supra note 9, at 57-62 (1890). 
18 Sec I ROBINSON, op. cit. supra note 9, at 56; VAUGHN, THE UNITED STATES PATENT 
SYSTEM 29 (1956). 
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grant as an incentive has been questioned by writers19 and courts20 alike, 
it remains the primary justification of the grant. To negate the reasonable 
justification for the issuance of a patent, therefore, would require positive 
proof of the fallaciousness of the incentive theory-a difficult if not im-
possible task given the subjectivity of the subject matter. The long historical 
acceptance of the truth of the incentive theory makes it extremely doubtful 
that any weight of evidence would lead a court to deny its validity and 
strike down the patent laws on the basis that they do not promote science. 
Any change in the patent laws on such grounds would have to come from 
Congress. 
The decision in the principal case presents no startling new principles 
of patent law, but it does substantiate some accepted practices. From ac-
cepted premises of patent theory, the court reached a correct result. Absent 
constitutional amendment, or change in the basic patent laws by a Con-
gress convinced that present patent laws do not reach desired results, this 
decision will remain valid precedent. 
Stanley P. Wagner, Jr. 
19 The major criticism of the incentive premise is that invention would probably 
occur anyway. The inquiring scientific mind does not need economic incentive and, 
indeed, forgoes the reward in many cases. See VAUGHN, op. cit. supra note 18, at 106. 
Another attack is that made on the effect of patents on scientific research. It has been 
felt that too many research laboratories are confining their work to practical application 
rather than engaging in basic research, in the hope of finding patentable inventions. This 
effect is especially noticeable in the large corporate laboratories, where the thrust is to-
ward invention that may be protected by patents; it has also been discovered in the 
university laboratories, where the patent royalties are used to support the activities of 
the laboratory. This limits research to the creation of functional ideas based on old 
knowledge rather than a search for new and basic knowledge. See Melman, Impact of the 
Patent System on Research, StmCOMMllTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF 
THE SENATE COMM11TEE ON THE JUDICIARY (Study No. 11, 1958). 
20 "Interestingly enough, apparently many scientists like Faraday care little for 
monetary rewards; generally the motives of such outstanding geniuses are not pecuniary." 
Frank, Circuit Judge, in Katz v. Homi Signal Mfg. Co., 145 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1944). 
